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Industrial Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector:
Because It's There?
Stephen S. Boynton*
The test of a first rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed
ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to
function.
F. Scott Fitzgerald
The Crack-up, February 1936
In the past decade there has been an extremely vocal debate on whether the
concept of industrial collective bargaining is appropriate in the public employ-
ment sector. Although many variations of collective negotiations occur in pub-
lic employment today, it has been asserted that collective bargaining as known
in the private sector should be the only method of dealing with public employee
labor relations and that any other procedure should be replaced. The inevitable
climax of this debate was the introduction of legislation in the United States
Congress to impose federal jurisdiction for collective bargaining rights on all
state and local subdivisions, public and quasi-public corporations, housing au-
thorities and public agencies.'
The assumption of federal jurisdiction relies on the commerce clause2 and the
* B.A. Ohio State University 1959, LL.B. University of South Carolina School of Law 1965.
Partner in the law firm of McIntosh, Slover and Boynton, Washington, D.C. Member of the South
Carolina, District of Columbia and American Bar Associations. Mr. Boynton serves as counsel to
the Assembly of Governmental Employees.
1. H.R. 17282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H.R. 1225, H.R. 4503, H.R. 5762, H.R. 5844,
H.R. 7684, H.R. 7981, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); cf. H.R. 12532, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969)
which places all public employees under the Nat'l Labor Rel. Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152; H.R. 9324,
92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971) and S. 1951, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) dealing exclusively with
education. It was announced on Jan. 20, 1972 that hearings would commence on Mar. 1, 1972
before the Special Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Education and Labor of the House
of Representatives on H.R. 7684, H.R. 9324, and H.R. 12532. Statement of Rep. Frank Thompson
(D-N.J.) 118 CONG. REC. H 162 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1972). [The provisions of all the House bills
concerning the general subject are identical, so all citations to sections will equally apply to all bills.]
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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first and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution.' The only public employ-
ees excluded are "officials appointed or elected pursuant to a statute to a
policymaking position . . . .'" The bill allows employees to form, join, or
assist a labor organization and to bargain collectively. Further, the bill author-
izes employees to refrain from all union activities, except to the extent that a
collective bargaining agreement contains a union security provision such as a
union shop.' Union dues are checked off by the employer to any organization
designated by the employee, but where there is an exclusive representative, dues
must be checked off to that organization only.' The exclusive representative
includes only those unions which are recognized prior to the enactment of the
Act or which later become certified.' Certification comes from a five-member
National Public Employee Relations Commission appointed by the President.'
A union petition for an election (excluding supervisors) must be supported by
30 percent of the employees, and other unions can participate only if they can
show authorization from 10 percent of the bargain-unit. Only one election may
be conducted in any 12-month period. The Commission would determine the
unit in which the election and collective bargaining would take place., Any
individual, employer, or union may file a complaint on an alleged unfair labor
practice and is entitled to a hearing before a hearing examiner, whose decision
is final, unless the Commission determines that there are sufficient reasons to
review the case.' 0 Written agreements, enforceable in federal district court, are
authorized for arbitration of disputes concerning the interpretation of the agree-
ment." Provisions for mediation and fact-finding are provided; and if both
parties agree to submit disputed issues to final and binding arbitration, the
arbitration shall take precedence over all fact-finding procedures. 2 In applica-
tion, the Act
shall supersede all previous statutes concerning this subject matter
and shall preempt all contrary local ordinances, Executive orders,
legislation, rules, or regulations adopted by any State or any of its
political subdivisions or agents such as a personnel board or civil
service commission. 3
3. H.R. 1225, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. § 1 (1971).
4. Id. § 2(3).
5. Id. § 3.
6. Id. §4.
7. Id. § 2(6).
8. Id.§9.
9. Id. § 6.
10. Id. § 7.
11. Id. § 8.
12. Id. § 10.
13. Id. § 13.
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In short, this bill would become the only path by which any non-federal public
employee in any jurisdiction could seek changes in the labor relations area.
Although one might seriously debate the proposition that the history of
collective bargaining in the private sector has not brought "any sign of the
apocalypse,"" the time has come to seriously question whether it is realistic to
grant public employees the right to bargain collectively and, correspondingly,
afford them the right to strike. Certainly, it is not surprising that the president
of the largest public employee union in the country has stated that "[w]ithout
the right to strike, there can be no true collective bargaining for public employ-
ees."' 5 Now that the debate has reached Congress, attention should be focused
not only on the appropriateness of such collective bargaining in the public sector
but also on the need for such a concept, particularly one imposed by federal
action. The issue has obviously become more acute with the increasing mili-
tancy in the public sector. This is graphically illustrated by a comparison of
the strike of a few public employees at the Washington Naval Yard in August
of 183511 with the walk-out of 200,000 mail carriers and clerks in March of
1970.'1 Recent trends bring the issue into focus:
WORK STOPPAGES, 1958-1968 s
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Number of Number of Man-Days
Year Stoppages Workers Involved Idle
1958 15 1,720 7,510
1959 26 2,240 11,500
1960 36 28,600 58,400
1961 28 6,610 15,300
1962 28 31,100 79,100
1963 29 4,840 15,400
1964 41 22,700 70,800
1965 42 11,900 146,000
1966 142 105,000 455,000
1967 181 132,000 1,250,000
1968 254 201,800 2,545,200
14. Wellington & Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 78 YALE
L.J. 1107, 1109 (1969).
15. Jerry Wurf, President, American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees,
AFL-CIO, AFL-CIO NEWS, March 19, 1966. AFSCME has also developed a model state collec-
tive bargaining bill for the public sector and non-profit institution employees. See 383 BNA GOV'T
EMPLOYEES REL. REP. [hereinafter cited as G.E.R.R.] B-3 to B-4 (1971). For a discussion on the
background and growth of this union see Ross, Those Newly Militant Government Workers,
FORTUNE, Aug. 1968, at 104; Culhane, Washington Pressures/Public Employees' Union Stresses
Federal Action to Get More State, Local Clout, National Journal, Oct. 16, 1971, at 2082.
16. D. ZISKIND, ONE THOUSAND STRIKES OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES 7 (194U).
17. SeeCONG. Q., March27, 1970, at841;N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1970, at 1,col. 8.
18. 92 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 29, 30(1969).
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The figures emphasize two material points. First, the incidence of public
employee strikes is a national issue. In 1967 and 1968, 40 states had at least
one of these strikes."9 Secondly, every one of the strikes was illegal. Conse-
quently, the basic challenge of any public employee legislation is to prevent
disruption detrimental to the public interest and still provide millions of public
employees with the economic benefits found in the private sector. Either state
and local jurisdictions must provide orderly procedures to deal with the causes
of public employee unrest or Congress may have the unfortunate task of provid-
ing a possibly more extreme solution.
The trend today in public employment is not unlike the economic, political,
and social development in a private labor movement that has tremendously
influenced our society. The growth in the number of public employees is singu-
larly significant. There are over 12 million persons employed in the public
sector-twice the number employed 20 years ago.2 0 The importance and impact
of this labor force on our political and economic structure must be recognized,
and its problems realistically resolved. Professor Harold Davey has commented
that the decade of the 1970's will be referred to "in the year 2000 as 'the decade
of the public sector,' taking its place along with the 1880's and the 1930's as
one of the three most significant periods in the labor relations history of the
nation."2
The purpose of this article is to analyze the issue realistically and to determine
what will result from this legislative effort for public employees.
The No-strike Concept and Collective Bargaining
In the private sector the strike is now considered fundamental and is legisla-
tively recognized as a national labor policy in both the Norris-La Guardia Act"
and the National Labor Relations Act. 2 The use of the strike in the public
sector, however, has long been viewed as intolerable on the grounds that work
stoppages against the sovereign are illegal and that the services of government
19. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL REL., LABOR-MANAGEMENT POLICIES FOR
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 234-35 (1969).
20. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, HANDBOOK OF LABOR
STATISTICS 1968, at 80, table 41 (1968).
21. Davey, Resolving of Unrest in the Public Sector, 20 LAB. L.J. 529 (1969). An editorial in
The Journal of Commerce, discussing the proposed legislation in terms of the labor relations history
of the National Labor Relations Act, commented: "When one considers the history of industrial
labor relations in this country [Act], and as interpreted by the National Labor Relations Board,
one is apt to pause at this point. And those in Congress who are supporting the National Public
Employee Relations Bill would do well to pause, too." The Journal of Commerce, Mar. 19, 1971,
at 4, col. 2.
22. 29U.S.C.§§ 101-15(1970).
23. 29U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
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must not be interrupted. 4 This concept is embodied in the case law, statutes,
and opinions from the attorney general in 43 states."5 The federal government
statutorily prohibits strikes by federal employees.26 Four states, however, have
enacted legislation giving public employees the right to strike absent emergency
situations;27 several other states are studying the issue.2"
However, as the nation has witnessed in the recent past, the fact that a strike
may be pr6hibited is not controlfing. There is some question, therefore, whether
such a prohibition is relevant."9 Indeed, legal counsel to the unions involved in
the Charleston, South Carolina hospital employees' dispute in 19691" stated:
24. The statements on this point by the various national leaders in this century are noteworthy:
"There is no right to strike against the public safety by anybody, anywhere, any time." Telegram
from then Governor Calvin Coolidge to Samuel Gompers, President, American Federation of
Labor on the occasion of the Boston police strike, September 16, 1919 cited in A. LINK, AMERICAN
EPOCH 236 (2d ed. 1963); .... [A] strike of public employees manifests nothing less than an
intent on their part to prevent or obstruct the operations of [g]overnment until their demands are
satisfied. Such action, looking toward the paralysis of [g]overnment by those who have sworn to
support it, is unthinkable and intolerable." Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt to L.C. Steward,
President, Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Aug. 16, 1937, noting the organization's bylaw against
strikes. 1937 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 325 (1941); "So-
ciety cannot tolerate strikes that endanger the very survival of society. I don't think we ought to
have strikes in public service industry." Walter Reuther, 56 NAT'L CIVIC REV. 392, 394 (1967);
"A strike of public employees is not tolerable, but simply saying that is not a substitute for thought
and action." Address by former Secretary of Labor, George P. Shultz, before Assembly of Govern-
mental Employees, in Detroit, Michigan, Oct. 17, 1969.
25. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, SUMMARY OF STATE POLICY REGULATIONS FOR PUBLIC SECTOR
LABOR RELATIONS: STATUTES, ATTORNEY GENERALS' OPINIONS AND SELECTED COURT DECISIONS
(Nov. 1971).
26. 5 U.S.C. § 7311(3) (1970).
27. Hawaii Act 171, L. 1970; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 217.1 (Supp. 1971); MONT. REV. CODE
ANN. tit. 41, § 2209 (Supp. 1970); 21 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1704 (Supp. 1971). See also Schmidman,
Nurses and Pennsylvania's New Public Employee Bargaining Law, 22 LAB. L.J. 725 (1971); Smith,
State and Local Advisory Reports on Public Employment Labor Legislation: A Comparative
Analysis, 67 MICH. L. REV. 891 (1969).
When Gov. Raymond P. Shafer reluctantly signed the Pennsylvania bill he urged "all employees
and their bargaining agents to use this new labor tool wisely and in the best interest of all citizens
. . . so that differences can be resolved at the negotiation table, not on the street and picket lines
while school children, hospital patients and others in need of public service suffer." Washington
Post, July 26, 1970, at A-10, col. 4.
28. E.g., The Labor Law Committee of the Ohio State Bar Association in 1969 recommended
the repeal of the Ferguson Act which bans public employee strikes. OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 4117.01 to -.05 (1965). The proposed substitute would permit a strike if the public
employer and the labor organization were unable to reach an agreement after 45 days following
the recommendation from the fact-finding board, and the strike could continue until such time as
a collective bargaining agreement was reached. 42 OHIO BAR 563, 576 (1969).
29. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'r Robert E. Hampton stated in 1970 that the "Commission soon
will review the law prohibiting strikes by federal employees to determine whether the provisions are
relevant to the times in light of the postal and air traffic controllers strikes. ... Address by
Robert E. Hampton, Nat'l Ass'n of Internal Revenue Employees, Buffalo, New York, Sept. 4,
1970.
30. See Wechsler, They Walked Into the Sun, N.Y. Post, July 24, 1969, at 37, col. 3.
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It is not inconceivable that by the end of this decade almost all
public employees will enjoy the right to strike except where the
public health and welfare would be endangered."
Since penalties, in many instances, have not been enforced, many persons
favor the strike as a viable method of gaining employment concessions. As
Senator Robert P. Griffin has aptly stated: "[w]hen government cannot, or will
not, invoke the penalties it threatens, strikes are not only encouraged but
respect for the government is undermined."3
The real question is whether collective bargaining will deter the strike concept
or, if in fact collective bargaining can be successfully employed without use of
strikes. It has been advocated that there is no difference between the public and
the private employee, and therefore the strike tool in bargaining should be
available. A former counsel to the National Education Association took the
position in 1'964 that "strikes are impermissible in any governmental bargain-
ing system." 3 Four years later he stated that:
Experience has taught me that I was wrong. It is no longer clear to
me why the legality of a strike by bus drivers, for instance, should
depend on whether their employer is a municipal corporation or a
privately owned company. 4
Others have taken the position that the right to strike is the sine qua non of
the public employment bargaining process. 5 In 1966, the American Federation
of State, County and Municipal Employees [AFSCME] International Execu-
tive Board adopted the following position: "AFSCME insists upon the right
of public employees . . . to strike. To forestall this right is to handicap the free
31. Eisner & Sipser, The Charleston Hospital Dispute: Organizing Public Employees and the
Right to Strike, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 254, 270 (1970) (emphasis added).
32. Address by Senator Robert P. Griffin (R-Mich.), Nat'l Conf. of State Legislative Leaders,
Honolulu, Hawaii, Dec. 5, 1968.
33. Wollett, The Public Employee at the Bargaining Table: Promise or Illusion?, 15 LAB. L.J.
8, 12(1964).
34. Wollett, The Taylor Law and the Strike Ban, in PUBLIC EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATION AND
BARGAINING 29, 35 (1968).
Although the identical analogy is used by Professors Wellington and Winter, they conclude that
it "is only half of the issue. ... Wellington & Winter, supra note 14, at 1123-24.
35. "The most effective technique to produce acceptable terms to resolve disputes is voluntary
agreement of the parties, and the best system we have for producing agreements between groups is
collective bargaining-even though it involves conflict and the possibility of a work disruption.
There is no alternative." Kheel, Strikes and Public Employment, 67 MICH. L. REV. 931,942 (1969).
See also Burton & Krider, The Role and Consequences of Strikes by Public Employees, 79 YALE
L.J. 418 (1970): Donahue, What Do Unions Want?, in THE CRISIS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS
IN THE DECADE OF THE SEVENTIES 35, 37 (1970); Eisner & Sipser, supra note 31, at 271. Comment,
Public Employees-The Right to Organize. Bargain, and Strike, 19 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 361, 370-
71 (1970).
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collective bargaining process."3 Others, including this author, are not con-
vinced.
The battles over the right of public unions to organize are all but over on the
state level,3 7 and clearly finished on the federal level.3" The next question is
whether Congress has the power to impose collective bargaining on all non-
federal employees. As was mentioned earlier, the pending legislation relies on
the commerce clause and the first and fourteenth amendments to the Constitu-
tion to invoke federal jurisdiction. Arvid Anderson, chairman of the Office of
Collective Bargaining in New York City, has suggested that, under Maryland
v. Wirtz,3 9 the federal government has broad authority to regulate conditions
of employment for state and local schools under the Fair Labor Standards Act40
and that the reach of the Taft-Hartley Act4 might be extended by deleting from
it the exemption for state and local subdivisions. Second, many states already
have some form of collective bargaining laws.42 And finally, it is well established
that the mere prohibition of a strike will neither prevent strikes nor collective
bargaining from developing.
Recognizing these factors, however, does not necessarily lead to the conclu-
sion that collective bargaining with the right to strike belongs in the public
sector. There are fundamental and practical differences between public and
private employment which demand distinct labor relations treatment. No
amount of rhetoric or perversion of established principles can hide the need for
separate labor policy considerations and responses.43
36. Policy Statement on Public Employee Unions; Rights and Responsibilities, Adopted by
Int'l Executive Board of AFSCME. AFL-CIO, July 26, 1966, in SORRY . . . No GOVERNMENT
TODAY 67-8 (R. Walsh ed. 1969).
37. See AFSCME v. Woodward, 406 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1969); McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398
F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968); cf Atkins v. City of Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D.N.C. 1969). See
also ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL REL., LABOR-MANAGEMENT POLICIES FOR
STATE AND LOCAL GOV'T 27 (1969).
38. See Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. 21 (1962), 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1970) promulgated by
Pres. John F. Kennedy; Exec. Order No. 11,491, 3 C.F.R. 510 (1969), 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1970).
Cf. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970). H.R. 1225, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
39. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1970).
41. 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1970). Mr. Anderson's position was given in an address at a Symposium
on Labor-Management, at the University of Kentucky Labor Education Center, Nov. 14, 1969.
42. Mitchell & Sorenson, State Labor Legislation Enacted in 1969, 93 MONTHLY LAB. REV.
48, 51-52 (1970); Report of ABA Committee on State Labor Laws, 310 G.E.R.R. E-1 (1969); U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 25. At the Fortieth American Assembly (a national non-partisan
education institution) held in October, 1971 on collective bargaining in government, the final report
recommended that collective bargaining rights "be extended to all levels of government, and to all
eligible employees." Collective Bargaining in American Government, in FINAL REPORT OF THE
FORTIETH AMERICAN ASSEMBLY 5 (1971).
43. If there were no distinction, denial of the right to strike to public employees might not
withstand the challenge of the due process and equal protection requirements of the fifth and
[Vol. 21:568
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The most obvious difference in the employment is the political versus eco-
nomic discipline. Certainly, the question of wages and benefits is an economic
consideration to both types of employees, but the public employer is not faced
with the market restraints that face the private employer. It certainly is not a
convincing argument to say that the public employer's concern over taxes "may
result in a close substitute for market constraints,"" when the economic ingre-
dients of the tax structure and the private industrial profit system are as similar
as an anti-ballistic missile and a sling shot. When thousands of transit workers
went on a 12-day strike in New York in 1966,11 the public pressure for a swift
settlement was in no way connected with the cost. The public demanded action.
The "cost" factor at that time-whether through increased taxes or decreased
services-could not be the controlling factor for the public or, in the face of
public demand, for the government.
The Condon-Wadlin Law, 6 which prohibited such a strike and prescribed
penalties, could not be effectively invoked since its enforcement would have
denied the workers the very wage increase negotiated." The enormous pressure
placed on the political entities by the public affected by such a strike does not
realistically include any economic considerations or results. For example, after
a 12-hour strike by firefighters in Newark, New Jersey, state urban aid funds
originally authorized for the poor were diverted to salary increases." This situa-
tion clearly illustrates not only an imbalance in the political process, but also a
conflict in the development of appropriate governmental priorities.
In City of New York v. DeLury, 9 the Taylor Law5" ban on public employee
strikes was unanimously upheld. The court stated that:
[Tihe orderly functioning of our democratic form of representative
government and the preservation of the right of our representatives
to make budgetary allocations-free from the compulsions of crip-
pling strikes-require the regulation of strikes by public employees
.whereas there is no similar countervailing reason for prohibitions in
fourteenth amendments to the Constitution on the ground that if similar work is performed in the
private sector with the right to strike it is a denial of due process and equal protection not to permit
the strike in the public sector.
44. Burton & Krider, supra note 35, at 425.
45. N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1966, at I, col. 8.
46. Law of March 27, 1947, ch. 391, [19471 N.Y. Laws 842, as amended Law of April 23, 1963,
ch. 702 [1963] N.Y. Laws 2432 (repealed 1967).
47. N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 200-12 (McKinney Supp. 1971). For a review of the deliberations
that led the committee recommending the new law, see FINAL REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMM.
ON PUBLIC EmPILOYE REL., STATE OF NEW YORK (1966) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT].
48. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1969, at 25, col. 7.
49. 23 N.Y. 175, 243 N.E.2d 128, 295 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1968), appeal dismissed, 394 U.S. 455
(1969), rehearing denied, 396 U.S. 872 (1969).
50. N.Y. CIv. SERv. LAW § 200-12 (McKinney Supp. 1971).
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the private sector.5'
Simply stated, there are major differences between the decision-making pro-
cesses of government and those of the private sector, a difference which persists
whether talking of essential or nonessential government services." As stated in
the Taylor Committee Report, which prepared New York's Public Employee
Fair Employment Law:
Careful thought about the matter shows conclusively, we believe,
that while the right to strike normally performs a useful function in
the private enterprise sector (where relative economic power is the
final determinant in making of private agreements), it is not compat-
ible with the orderly functioning of our democratic form of repre-
sentative government (in which relative political power is the final
determinant).5 3
It has been argued that the devices that one group uses for political pressure
(e.g., a citizens' group for a new school) and the economic pressure another
group might use (e.g., striking sanitation workers for higher wages) are really
the same. Both seek to influence executive and legislative determinations such
as the allocation of funds and the tax rate. Even considering the "nature of the
means" used to pressure the government, there really is no distinction. 4 How-
ever, this position ignores the political result. The new school may have to wait
for the completion of a new sewer as a proper governmental decision on priori-
ties, but the pressure to remove the garbage from the streets will not await the
political process. In short, strikes inconvenience the voter and pressure is put
on the office holder to eliminate that inconvenience. Voters will support those
office seekers who avoid the strike or eliminate it swiftly. The results are the
vulnerability of the political unit, the increased power of one group to the
disadvantage of other political groups, and the distortion of the total political
process.5
51. 23 N.Y. 175, 186,243 N.E.2d 128, 134,295 N.Y.S.2d 901,909 (1968).
52. Many writers have made distinctions on what is an "essential service." See, e.g., Burton &
Krider, supra note 35, at 427 where the following breakdown is given:
(I) essential services-police and fire-where strikes immediately endanger public
health and safety;
(2) intermediate services-sanitation, hospitals, transit, water and sewage-where
strikes of a few days might be tolerated;
(3) nonessential services-streets, parks, education, housing, welfare and general ad-
ministration-where strikes of indefinite duration could be tolerated.
53. FINAL REPORT, supra note 47, at 18-19. It was also noted that to determine what would be
"essential and non-essential governmental services" would be "administratively impossible."
54. Burton & Krider, supra note 35, at 430.
55. For a good discussion on the political pressures of public employment groups, see Murphy,
The Politics of Employee Relations, in THE CRISIS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS IN THE DECADE
OF THE SEVENTIES 123 (1970).
[Vol. 21:568
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Although it is contended that, absent the right to strike, public employees will
have too little power at the bargaining table, the real issue is whether or not
the public employee is, or believes he is, being treated fairly. Consequently, the
task of the legislator is to design alternatives to the collective bargaining-strike
concept that achieve acceptability.
The author of the legislation in the 92nd Congress that would impose federal
jurisdiction collective bargaining on the states and local entities stated:
Those who oppose the idea of collective bargaining for public em-
ployees will inevitably object that the right to bargain collectively
ultimately means the right to strike. Although this bill neither cre-
ates nor prohibits the right to strike, it should be noted that the
present system has not avoided strikes by public employees even
though such strikes are illegal."
Although it is all too true that the illegal strike has become an "alternative"
to the legal process, the answer is not to condone, or even encourage, illegal
strikes by such legislation, but rather to seek and support the viable alternatives
that will avoid the disruption or the threat thereof. Conferring collective bar-
gaining rights on public employees (silent or not on the right to strike) does not
provide the panacea to work stoppages. Within the first year after the passage
of Michigan's Public Employee Relations Act,57 providing collective bargaining
for non-state public employees, there were 12 strikes by municipal employees.
In the 17 years prior to passage, there were only 13 strikes." The Taylor
Committee was mindful of this experience and even anticipated an increase in
strikes when they recommended granting exclusive recognition and bargaining
rights to public employees. 5 The strikes occurred as predicted."0 In 1969, Gover-
nor Rockefeller stated that the Taylor Law "fj]udged solely on its ability to
prevent [work] stoppage. . . is indeed imperfect."'"
It would not seem to be an irrelevant inquiry to ask whether this nation is
prepared to accept legislation to grant exclusive recognition and bargaining
56. Statement of Rep. Abner 1. Mikva (D. Ill.) on introduction of H.R. 1225, 92d Cong., Ist
Sess. (1971), 117 Cong. Rec. E 1647-48 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 1971) (emphasis added).
57. Micti. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 423.201 to -.216 (1967). This law does not cover state
employees but only employees of cities, counties, and school boards. The difference in public
employee labor relations will be discussed later in the article.
58. Rapoport, Militant Public Employees, Wall St. J., Aug. 9, 1966, at 14, col. 4.
59. Supra note 47, at 42, 43, 53.
60. E.g., in September 1967, the teachers struck for 14 days. N.Y. Times, Sept. II, 1967, at
I, col. 8. The Taylor Act had to be set aside to avert a 1968 transit strike. N.Y. Times, Jan. I,
1968, at I, col. 3. In the fall of 1968, New York's city schools were closed for two months. Mayer,
The Full and Sometimes Very Surprising Story of Ocean Hill, The Teachers' Union and the
Teachers' Strikes of 1968, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1969, § 6 (Magazine), at 18.
61. The Chief, The New York City Civil Employees' Weekly, Jan. 17, 1969, at 1.
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rights to all public employees, when that legislation is purposely silent on the
question of strikes. Collective bargaining with the right to strike is admittedly
a tool in labor relations, but it does not necessarily follow that it must be
employed simply because it is there.
Based upon their circumstances, experience, and individual needs, the states
have developed a variety of measures to deal with the issue. Some of these
measures include fact-finding with recommendations," collective bargaining
with provisions designed to ban the strike, 3 meet-and-confer mechanisms, 4 and
a variety of combinations thereof. In short, there is a middle ground.
An example of such a middle ground is the Michigan experience. In a letter
to the Detroit Free Press, the Michigan State Personnel Director asserted that,
by using a system of formally organized joint advance fact-finding and confer-
ence mechanisms with all levels participating, "the State is developing a viable
alternative in public employee paysetting to the strike and confrontation now
commonly used with disturbing frequency in determining pay for public work-
ers." 5 In answering the charge that the state employees had no voice and were
completely bound by budgets, the Director stated:
It is a tragic mistake to assume that simply because state employees
are not exclusively organized and geared to automatically attempt
to enforce their demands via a strike they should be expected to
accept a Civil Service Commission decision dictated solely by
"budget" restraints. This did not happen this year and if that time
ever comes, such a system will result in the same "solution" we find
under [the Public Employee Relations Act utilizing collective bar-
gaining for non-state public employees]."
62. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-467-78 (Supp. 1969); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149,
§ 178D (Supp. 1970), §§ 178 F-N (Supp., 1969); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 17.455 (1968); N.Y.
Civ. Ser. Laws §§ 200-12 (McKinney Supp. 1971); WIs. STAT. § 111.70 and §§ 111.80-.94
(1969). See also Gould, Public Employment: Mediation, Fact Finding and Arbitration, 55 A.B.A.J.
835 (1969). Cf. Lev, Strikes By Government Employees: Problems and Solutions, 57 A.B.A.J. 771
(1971) which was the article winning the 1971 ABA Ross Essay Contest that recommended a statute
to establish a Public Employee Mediation Board for all public employees resulting in the unioniza-
tion of all public employees. This article was strongly attacked in an editorial in The Dallas
Morning News on September 6, 1971 and called upon the ABA to make its position on the point
clear. ABA President Leon Jaworski answered the editorial by letter, dated September 14, 1971,
stating that the ABA had no position on the views of Mr. Lev since no official policy had been
taken. 57 A.B.A.J. 1129(1971).
63. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1301-13 (Supp. 1971); Mo. REV. STAT. § 105.500-
.530 (Supp. 1967); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-9.4-1 to .4-19 (Supp. 1970); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 41-56.010-.900(Supp. 1969).
64. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13,085 (West Supp. 1971); ORE. REV. STAT. § 342.460 (I)
(1969).
65. Letter from Sidney Singer, State Personnel Director, State of Michigan to Editor, Detroit




The "solution" of collective bargaining for employees of cities, counties, and
school boards in Michigan has resulted in "[mlillions of lost man-hours in
hundreds of strikes in public employmer, in Michigan in recent years ... ""
Another consequence of the national institution of the industrial collective
bargaining concept would be the demise of the merit system. Supported by
independent public employee associations, the merit system advocates the selec-
tion and promotion to all positions in government service on the basis of merit
as demonstrated by competitive examination; the removal or suspension of an
employee only for cause after a fair hearing; the right of every citizen to com-
pete competitively for a public position without regard to race, creed, color,
religion, or political affiliation; and the exemption from the merit system of
those who are elected and those involved in policy-making functions." The
policies which guide the independent public employee organization are con-
ceived and executed at the local jurisdictional level, as opposed to the union
concept of outside control and discipline. Further, the independents support the
statutory approach to public employee relations as opposed to the union con-
cept of contract. The major distinction in philosophy is that the independent
advocates the resolution of impasses by mediation and arbitration without the
threat or use of work stoppages and strikes.69
The differences are dramatic. The 1970 Convention of the American Federa-
tion of Government Employees (AFGE) voted to repeal a section of its constitu-
tion which stated that the organization was "opposed to, and will not engage
in strikes." This had been "basic law" since the founding of AFGE in 1932.10
67. Id. One writer has observed that regardless of the merits, public employee gains through
collective bargaining will be costly to the public by (1) the unavoidable increase in tax burdens which
they will produce, for costs-per-unit-of-public service produced show no likelihood of being reduced;
(2) the interruptions which will occur in the flow of public goods and services; and (3)the reductions
which may occur in the quality of public service as significant numbers of public employees reflect
new found strength by contesting the efforts of public managers to improve efficiency and quality
in the public service. Gitlow, Public Employee Unionism in the United States: Growth and Outlook,
21 LAB. L.J. 766, 778 (1970).
68. See Position Statement of the Assembly of Governmental Employees, Labor Management
Relations in State and Local Public Service 8-11 (1969).
69. The independents as well as the unions also oppose the subcontracting of public services to
political or profit oriented concerns. For a discussion of this point as it relates to the bargaining
position in the strike concept see Burton & Krider, supra note 52, at 425, 440. It has been observed
that "a great many collective bargaining contracts are concluded without strikes." Therefore, "the
crucial issue is not whether strikes should be permitted in the public sector, but whether the
collective bargaining process itself can be made so effective absent the right to strike that the need
for work stoppages will be obviated." Anderson, Strikes and Impasse Resolution, 67 MtcH. L.
REv. 943, 947 (1969). The point is certainly well taken to the merits of avoiding strikes, but if the
threat and option of the strike remains, the issue is still before the parties during the negotiations.
70. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., New Era For Federal Workers-Bigger Unions, Strike
Threats, Aug. 24, 1970, at 62.
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As mentioned earlier, the American Federation of State, County and Munici-
pal Employees reaffirmed their right to strike in 1966. 7" Quite clearly then, the
traditional merit system which insures tranquility in the public sector and pro-
motes orderly procedures for the needs of public employees would be eliminated
with collective bargaining that includes the right to strike.
There is no room for debate that for "those states which have yet to develop
state policies in public employee labor relations, time is running out.""2 There
is room for doubt, however, as to whether the answer is to impose legislation
which, as even its author concedes, is silent on the strike issue, and to overrule
all state and local laws governing public employee relations. Through the politi-
cal process it has been demonstrated that procedures can be developed to meet
the peculiar problems of the jurisdiction, short of the industrial concept of
collective bargaining. Justice Brandeis once observed that "[n]early all legisla-
tion includes a weighing of public needs as against private desires; and likewise
a weighing of relative social value."73
The public needs and the demands of the public employee can be equitably
resolved without the social disruption of strike tactics.
In sum, it is suggested that the ban on public strikes be continued with
realistic penalty procedures designed to cope with violations. Secondly, if a no-
strike policy prevails, it will be successful only if the demands of public employ-
ees are met through appropriate merit system and bargaining techniques. This
goal can be achieved through the political processes not as a total solution, but
as an effort to achieve a workable situation. There is no final solution, but we
should not as a nation try to achieve finality and uniformity without the clear
understanding of the results, and a full exploration of the alternatives.
71. Supra note 36.
72. State-Local Employee, Labor Relations, in THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOv'Ts 51 (Dec. 1970).
73. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 356(1921) (dissenting opinion).
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